Multicountry Model
In this chapter, I provide more details on computing equilibrium paths for the dynamic general equilibrium model analyzed in the main text. Specifically, I report the first-order conditions before and after detrending variables that grow over time. I then discuss the algorithm used to compute the equilibrium paths on a parallel processor. Codes and documentation are available at my website (www.minneapolisfed.org/research/economists/emcgrattan.html).
Maximization problems
The model used here is a version of McGrattan and Prescott (2010) with constant taxes and a simplified portfolio choice. I let i index countries, i = 1, . . . , I, and j index multinational companies. Without loss of generality, I will work with a representative multinational, where the index j denotes the country of incorporation.
Multinational problem
Multinational j solves
where
and i χ j i = 1,
Outputs are given by t if i = j and A i σ it (1 + γ A ) t otherwise.
The first-order conditions for the multinational j with respect to the labor inputs and capital stocks are given by (1 − δ M ) / (1 − τ pj ) .
Household problem
Households choose sequences of consumption C it , labor L it , and assets B it+1 to solve the following problem:
where τ li and τ d are tax rates on labor and company distributions, and r bt is the after-tax return on lending/borrowing. I assume that country i has a population of size N it . Note that the measure of a country's production locations is proportional to its population.
Hence, I use the same notation for both variables and set the constant of proportionality equal to one (without loss of generality).
If U (c, l) = log c + ψ log(1 − l), then the first-order conditions with respect to C i , L i , and B i for the household in country i are
where λ i is the Lagrange multiplier associated with household i's budget constraint.
Market clearing
Markets must clear for goods, assets, and labor. The worldwide resource constraint for goods is
The asset market-clearing condition is
for all t, and the labor market-clearing conditions are
. . , I.
Detrended variables
I'll use lowercase letters for growth-detrended variables. Specifically, let
where γ Y is the growth rate of output, γ y is the growth rate of per capita output, and γ A is the growth rate of total factor productivity (TFP). Using the production technology, I
can determine the growth rate of total output on the balanced growth path:
where γ N is the growth rate of the population (and locations) on a balanced growth path.
Detrended first-order conditions
Substituting detrended variables into first-order conditions implies that
(1.3.20)
Adding adjustment costs
In the 104-country version of the model, small adjustment costs to investment were added to aid in the computations. Numerical problems arise because of investment hitting corners. In this section, I consider adding adjustment costs, which eventually were driven close to zero given a good guess of the final solution.
Let ϕ T (X/K), ϕ I (X/K), and ϕ M (X/K) be the costs of adjusting investment in tangible capital, plant-specific intangible capital, and technology capital, respectively. The capital accumulation equations are now given by
The Lagrangian for the multinational j can be written as follows:
The new first-order conditions for multinational j with respect to the capital stocks are given by
where terms like ϕ T t and ϕ ′ T t are shorthand for the functions evaluated at the time t ratio of investment to capital.
BEA accounts
I now apply the same procedure as the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) to set up the national and international accounts for the model economy. I'll use the notation J i to mean the set of multinationals incorporated in i. This implies the following for gross domestic product (GDP) and gross national product (GNP) and their components:
Tax liability:
• GNP it = GDP it + Net factor receipts less payments Net factor receipts (from l = i)
Net factor payments (to l = i)
• Balance of payments: Current account = Financial account Current account = Net exports + net factor receipts less payments
Next, consider the accounts for the two-country case that will be central to the propositions that come later. For ease of exposition, let i be Ireland and r be the rest of world. I index companies in Ireland by d, which I'll refer to as "Domestic." I'll index rest-of-world (ROW) companies by f , which I'll refer to as "Foreign."
The current account (CA) is the sum of net exports (NX) plus net factor receipts (NFR) less net factor payments (NFP):
is the total tangible capital stock in country i, and
is total plant-specific investment in country i. In writing net factor payments, I assume that B it < 0 and therefore net factor interest is paid by Ireland to rest of world. I also assume that multinationals expense their investment of technology capital at home.
Next, consider the financial account (FA), which is the change in assets and given by
In this version of the model, there are two countries: i (e.g., Ireland) and r (e.g., ROW). I assume from the start that Ireland is small in size relative to the ROW. Companies 
with the capital accumulation equations as given above. ROW multinationals f solve
The household problem for the Irish is
The ROW households solve a similar problem except that they also receive an additional income {ǫ t }, which is added to household income in order to implement a numerical "trick" described later. The problem is
where the tilde (˜) denotes the equilibrium values for a model with r bt = (1 + γ y )/β − 1 for t = 1, . . . , t * . Alternatively, the income adjustment can be written in terms of incomes rather than products as follows:
Adding the income to the ROW budget in (1.6.1) ensures that the equilibrium of the ǫ-economy is the same as one with ǫ t = 0 for all t and r bt equal to (1 + γ y )/β − 1 for t ≤ t * .
For Propositions 1-3, I assume that the ǫ t are nonzero for t = 1, . . . , t * . For t > t * , ǫ t = 0. I refer to this case as the ǫ-economy. Figure 1 shows the difference between the interest rates with and without the ROW income adjustment, which is shown in Figure 2 .
Proposition 1. The small country's output, labor, and capital stocks in the ǫ-economy are at or below their historical trends between t = 1 and t = t * , while consumption is above. The reverse is true for the large country.
Proof. Suppose that at t = 1, consumption c it in Ireland is above its historical trend, c i1 > c i0 . Then, between t = 2 and t = t * , c it = c i1 since
where the first equation follows from (1.3.14) and (1.3.16), and the second equation follows from the fact that r bt = (1 + γ y )/β − 1 by choice of {ǫ t } adjustment.
From the intratemporal first-order condition of Irish households (1.3.15), with labor productivity in (1.3.6) substituted for the real wage, I get
In the period prior to liberalization of the capital account, only domestic firms are operating, so
where y it /l it is total labor productivity. I can use this relation to determine what happens to employment between t = 0 and t = 1.
To do that, I take the ratio of labor productivity in the first period relative to its trend (that is, the t = 0 level):
Since output depends on beginning of period capital stocks, which are given and equal to historical levels, (1.6.3) implies
restate the problem of determining what happens to employment between t = 0 and t = 1 as finding out whether the value for x in the following equation,
is less or greater than 1, since x is the ratio of labor inputs in the two periods. The lefthand side of (1.6.5) is everywhere increasing in x, and the right-hand side is everywhere decreasing, which means there is a unique solution. At x = 1, the left-hand side of (1.6.5) exceeds 1 and the right-hand side is equal to 1, which means that the intersection must lie below 1. Thus, l i1 < l i0 . Furthermore, y i1 < y i0 since capital stocks are fixed. With curvature in the production function, it must be the case that (true) productivity rises
If t * > 2, then in period t = 2, output and labor must fall further relative to the historic trend, because domestic capital stocks fall between the first and second periods.
To demonstrate this, I first substitute returns to capital in (1.3.7)-(1.3.9) into the dynamic
Euler equations in order to relate capital-output ratios to the return r bt ; that is,
for the period t = 2, . . . , t * . Note that the last equation has only one term because the Irish firms are assumed to operate only domestically. If the return r bt is equal to
(1 + γ y )/β − 1, then the capital-output ratios must be equal to their historical levels prior to FDI liberalization. Using this fact along with the production technologies in (1.3.5), it follows that labor productivity in the second period must also be at its historical level,
where I am using the fact that l it = l d it and y it = y d it in t ≤ t * . If labor productivity is on trend and consumption is equal to the level in period 1, then it follows from (1.6.3) that l i2 < l i1 , which in turn implies that l i2 < l i0 . In other words,
It follows immediately that y i2 < y i1 , which in turn implies that y i2 < y i0 .
Since the interest rate r bt does not change between t = 2 and t * , it must be the case that y it = y i2 and l it = l i2 , t ≤ t * . This follows from the intratemporal condition and the fact that capital-output ratios and consumptions relative to trend are constant.
The same arguments as above can be made for the large country. However, because the global resource constraint must hold, the paths relative to trend for the large country must be reversed. To see this, recall the global resource constraint prior to FDI openness:
If consumption is above trend between t = 1 and t = t * in both Ireland and the ROW, it follows from the arguments above that output and investments are below trend in both countries. In fact, output and investments must be down by the same percentage between t = 2 and t = t * − 1 because capital-output ratios are on trend. In this case, I can rewrite (1.6.6) as
for t = 2, . . . , t * − 1, which leads to a contradiction of the claim that both consumptions are initially above their historical trends. The same logic can be used to prove that both consumptions are not below their historical trends initially.
Finally, I need to show that consumption is initially above trend in Ireland, which is the recipient of future foreign direct investment, and initially below trend for the ROW, which is the source of the foreign direct investment. This follows from the fact that there is no change in effective TFP for the ROW when σ it > 0 because y To summarize, I've shown that
• c r1 < c r0 , c rt = c r1 , t = 2, . . . , t * ;
• y i1 < y i0 , y i2 < y i1 , y it = y i2 , t = 2, . . . , t * ;
• y r1 > y r0 , y r2 > y r1 , y rt = y r2 , t = 2, . . . , t * ;
• l r1 > l r0 , l r2 > l r1 , l rt = l r2 , t = 2, . . . , t * ;
• y i1 /l i1 > y i0 /l i0 , y it /l it = y i0 /l i0 , t = 2, . . . , t * ;
• y r1 /l r1 < y r0 /l r0 , y rt /l rt = y r0 /l r0 , t = 2, . . . , t * ;
Proposition 2. The small country's GDP and GNP in the ǫ-economy initially, after the announcement, rise above their historical trends and then fall below trend between t = 2 and t = t * . The reverse is true for the large country.
Proof. Detrended GDP in the small country, Ireland, is given by
= 0 and therefore GDP is domestic output less investments in plant-specific intangible capital and technology capital by domestic companies. To show that Irish GDP is above its historical trend in t = 1, I must show that intangible investments of domestic firms (indexed by d) fall by more than output. This is shown as follows:
where the first equality uses the capital accumulation equation after detrending all variables, the second equality follows from the fact that the capital-output ratio in the second period is equal to the historical capital-output ratio, the inequality follows from Proposition 1, and the final inequality follows from the fact that δ I ≤ 1. Thus, plant-specific intangible investment must fall by more than output. The same argument can be made for technology capital. Therefore, GDP must be above trend in t = 1.
GNP is equal to GDP in the first period because there are no net factor incomes if B i0 = 0 and FDI income is zero. Thus, in the first period, when the policy is announced, net factor incomes for the period are already determined and GNP must equal GDP.
In the second period, since the capital-output ratios are at their historical trends, GDP in Ireland must be below its own trend by the same amount as output. GNP, on the other hand, is not necessarily equal to GDP because bond repayments are made by
Ireland to the ROW. In other words,
for t = 1, . . . , t * − 1, where B i1 = 0, B i2 > 0, and B it < 0 for t = 3, . . . , t * − 1. The pattern of Irish debt can be determined from net exports in the transition period, since
and since net exports are equal to GDP less domestic consumption and investment-and all three of these variables are constant relative to their historical trends between t = 2 and t = t * − 1. Thus, net exports must also be constant relative to its historical trend.
In t = t * , GDP falls further below its historical trend than output has fallen because investment of foreign multinationals in both tangible and plant-specific intangible capital rises above zero. GDP is lower because of the rise in plant-specific intangible investment.
The arguments made for the small country can be made for the large country, but the direction of change is reversed for the periods t = 1 to t = t * . Figures 3 and 4 show the transition paths of consumption, labor, output, capital, GDP, and GNP in the case that income adjustments are not made to the ROW budget constraints. These are the analogues of Figures 3 and 4 in the main text, which displayed the results assuming a small adjustment in ǫ t was made to keep the interest rate constant in transition.
With constraints on portfolio flows
If portfolio flows are restricted over the same period as FDI flows, then the interest rate is no longer (approximately) constant prior to financial liberalization. In this case, deriving specific analytic solutions for all of the paths of variables of interest is not easy. Instead, I consider whether variables are above or below trend and show a graphic comparison of the economies with and without portfolio restrictions.
Proposition 3. The small country's output and labor with full capital account restrictions are below their historical trend between t = 1 and t = t * . The reverse is true for the large country.
Proof. If, in t = 1, consumption in Ireland rises relative to its historical trend, c i1 > c i0 , then the intratemporal first-order condition of households, namely,
implies that labor and output fall initially. With capital fixed, labor falls more than output.
With no borrowing or lending allowed across countries, total investment y i1 − c i1 must be below trend. With returns equated across assets, investment in all three types of assets-tangible capital, plant-specific intangible capital, and technology capital-must be below trend.
In period t = 2, output and labor must fall further because domestic capital stocks are lower between the first and second periods when investment in t = 1 is below trend.
Households cannot borrow from abroad; thus, output, investment, and labor continue to fall until t = t * , and net exports remain equal to zero until the restrictions on FDI are relaxed.
Again, the same arguments can be made for the large country, but because the global resource constraint must hold, the paths relative to trend for the large country must be reversed. Because the small country is the recipient of future FDI while the large country is its source, the initial consumption in the small country must be above its historical trend, and the initial consumption in the large country must be below. Otherwise, the global resource constraint would be violated.
Figures 5 through 8 compare the transitions with and without portfolio restrictions.
Not surprisingly, the transitions are more gradual with portfolio restrictions, since the small country cannot immediately take advantage of the higher effective TFP that is coming in the future.
Computation of a general I-country version
Now, I describe the algorithm used to compute equilibrium paths in a general I-country version of the model over T periods.
Let me start with some notation. Let P be a n p -dimensional vector of prices and transfers, where n p = T − 1 + 2T I and the vector includes T − 1 interest rates, T I wage rates, and T I transfers. Let Q i be a n q -dimensional vector of quantities for country i, where n q = 4T + 2T I and the vector includes T country-i consumptions, T country-i aggregate labor supplies, T country-i next period debt holdings, T investments in technology capital made by companies from country i, T I investments in tangible capital made by companies from country i at home and abroad in all other countries, and T I investments in plantspecific tangible capital made by companies from country i at home and abroad in all other countries. Let Q be a n q × I matrix with column i given by Q i .
Next, consider the steps of the algorithm to compute equilibrium P * and Q * on a parallel computer. That is, find P * and Q * such that
where F is a n p -dimensional function and G i is a n q -dimensional function.
The first-order conditions stacked up in F are T − 1 global resource conditions in (1.3.17), T I market-clearing conditions for labor in (1.3.19), and T I conditions relating transfers to tax revenues in (1.3.20).
The first-order conditions stacked up in G i are the budget constraint (1.3.10), the household intratemporal first-order condition that combines (1.3.15) and (1.3.6), the relation between the interest rate and marginal rates of substitution that combines (1.3.14)
and (1.3.16), and all of the dynamic Euler equations that combine (1.3.7) through (1.3.13).
Conditions (1.3.1)-(1.3.5) are used to construct dividends, capital stocks, and outputs. If T and I are large, it is best to move gradually from the steady state (with no change in N it or σ it over time) to the parameterization of interest. Also, if analytic derivatives are used in finding the fixed points for P and Q that solve the first-order conditions, then the codes run considerably faster.
Chapter 2.
Data Sources
For the 104-country benchmark model, I use the following series that are available from the World Development Indicators:
• GDP in current U.S. dollars (NY.GDP.MKTP.CD)
• GDP in constant 2000 U.S. dollars (NY.GDP.MKTP.KD)
• Total population (SP.POP.TOTL)
• Foreign direct investment, net inflows, in current U.S. dollars (BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD)
• Portfolio investment, excluding liabilities constituting foreign authorities' reserves, in Chapter 4.
Sensitivity Analyses
In this chapter, I report the results of various sensitivity analyses. The first set of experiments considers the impact on the transition to FDI openness as I vary model parameters, including the assumption of perfect-foresight expectations. In the second set of experiments, I vary time paths of tax rates that were fixed in the benchmark parameterization.
Then, I consider alternative sources for employment shares and balance of payments data.
Finally, I rerun the growth regressions for both data and model, varying the set of countries included in the sample and the choice of independent variables.
Alternative parameters
In this section, I describe how the transition path for the two-country version of the model changes as I vary key parameters. Here, I'll consider the impact on GDP of the timing of opening, relative country sizes, the share of technology capital, the degree of openness, and expectations about future openness. Figure 9 shows how the path changes as I vary four of the key parameters. The dark line in all graphs is the benchmark shown in Figure 4 for the small country. The other lines are results as I vary the date after which FDI is allowed t * , the relative population sizes N r /N i , the share of technology capital φ, and the degree of openness after σ * .
The first set of results in Figure 9 shows that the timing of opening matters little for the magnitude of the decline in GDP unless the enactment of the policy is immediate.
However, even in that case, there must still be a decline given the large increase in intangible investments that takes place.
The second set of results in Figure 9 shows that the initial declines and eventual increases in GDP are amplified with the relative populations. This result is not surprising given that the impact of FDI depends on how large the technology capital is abroad. The larger N r /N i , the larger the gap.
The third set of results in Figure 9 shows the impact of increasing the share of technology capital. The smaller this share φ, the smaller the incentive for FDI and the smaller the impact of FDI openness.
The final set of results in Figure 9 shows the impact of increasing the parameter governing how much FDI is allowed in. This parameter, which has a one-to-one impact on country TFP, amplifies the movements-both up and down-in GDP. the Irish did not know until t * that FDI would be allowed in during the following period.
In this case, the path of GDP would be on the historical trend before t * and would then follow the same path as the first curve in panel A of Figure 9 . In other words, at t * there would be a decline due to increased intangible investment, followed by an increase when capital markets opened. The transition would look similar to a situation in which the Irish faced tight constraints on their portfolio investments. There would be little movement in GDP relative to its historical trend until enactment of the policy change.
Time-varying tax rates
The benchmark simulation has time variation in only two exogenous series: population and the degree of openness. Other exogenous variables such as tax rates were assumed to be constant over the sample. In this section, I show that this choice does not affect the main results. 
IMF balance of payments data
The benchmark simulation is based on a 104-country model parameterized with data from the World Development Indicators. In this section, I report results for a 50-country version of the model parameterized with data from the IMF Balance of Payments. Figure 12 is the analogue of Figure 9 in the main text, except that I use the 50-country sample and IMF data. The main difference in country coverage is in terms of countries with low initial levels of per capita GDP relative to the United States. However, the main result is the same: the data generated by the model show no obvious relationship between capital restrictions and economic performance.
Growth regressions
In this section, I explore several variants of the specification for the growth regression analyzed in the main text. The main results of the exercise are shown in Table 1, which shows the benchmark specification along with several alternatives. The key finding is that in all cases that I explore, the predicted change in the growth rate due to a change in FDI openness is economically insignificant.
The first panel of Table 1 is the benchmark case using the full sample of 104 countries.
Recall that the coefficients on the ratio of FDI to GDP are too small to be economically relevant for either the data or model. In the case of the data, the coefficient is also and rely less on inward FDI. In the data, as before, the coefficient on FDI is insignificant.
Chapter 5.
Summary of Welfare and Growth Gains
In Table 2 , I report welfare and growth gains from the counterfactual experiments. These are also shown graphically in Figures 10 and 11 in the main text.
In some cases, binding nonnegativity constraints on investment made it difficult (if not impossible) to run the counterfactuals. Thus, not all countries in the sample are represented in 
